NAME

```
runcon — alter and consume SELinux context
```

SYNOPSIS

DESCRIPTION

Without program, writes the current SELinux security context, followed by a newline, to the standard output stream.

Otherwise, executes program arguments with a different context, if valid:

```
with context
with at least one of -urtl
with -c

with -c

mathering

context,

getcon() with the specified fields altered,
the context computed to label a new object, from getcon() to the
filesystem context of program, in the "process" security class,
with fields overriden as specified by -urtl, if any.
```

OPTIONS

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    -c, --compute
    -u, --user=user
    -r, --role=role
    -t, --type=type
    -1, --range=range
    Pre-compute context transition, cf. DESCRIPTION.
    Set user (the first field) to user.
    Set role (the second field) to role.
    Set type (the third field) to type.
    Set level-range (the fourth field) to range.
```

ENVIRONMENT

PATH In which program is searched when requested (except with $-\mathbf{c}$), confer execvp(3).

EXIT STATUS

127 program wasn't found.

program exists, but couldn't be executed for a different reason.

an error occurred in **runcon** (SELinux is not active, the final context or a field is

invalid, &c.).

All others returned by *program*, if executed, or **0**.

SEE ALSO

```
runcon(1), getcon(3), getfscon(3), security\_check\_context(3), setexeccon(3), selinux(8)
```

STANDARDS

Compatible with the GNU system, which exits 1 for set-up errors and executes program from the PATH even with -c, but uses it verbatim as a getfscon() argument — this means that runcon -c true will fail unless there's a true file in the current working directory and, if there is, its context will be used for the computation, rather than /bin/true's. This simply begs for a trojan horse scenario. Cf. Bug#1013924: coreutils: runcon -c getfscon()s program verbatim but execve()s it; trojan moment?: https://bugs.debian.org/1013924.